Tesco & Walmart: going in different directions to reach the same point?

News that Walmart are telling suppliers to 'keep those trade funds and put them toward the cost of goods' will result in significant - and permanent - price cuts, has to indicate that Asda may at least consider a similar approach in the UK....

Given that trade investment can be 20% of supplier selling prices - translating to 15% of net shelf-prices for a retailer on average margins of 25%, the impact on retail prices would be significant..

Meanwhile, Tesco's move from 27  to 3 negotiation points re trade investment would achieve a similar result on shelf.

Whilst each retailer is taking responsibility for setting the selling price in a drive for market share, the difference between the two approaches are:

• Walmart/Asda are implying that trade investment transferred into lower buying-in prices and then to EDLP has more impact on consumers    
• Tesco sees merit but overlap in some trade investment buckets and will presumably negotiate the transfer of 'surplus' monies to the front margin, where they will presumably fund price reductions?

The issue for UK suppliers has to  be the extent to which the other retailers will follow the trade-investment funded pricing route...

Easter 2015: Is nothing sacred?

                                                          Brighton Easter 2015    pic Brian Moore

...or, in flat-line markets, simply high-level headhunting, at the expense of the competition..?

There will always be someone who says they can do it cheaper...

    Thanks to Guillaume Quilliot via Jonathan Hughes

Tesco's Margin Objectives: Going from Back to Front to go Back to Basics

Given that Tesco plans to reduce the negotiating elements of Back Margin from 24 to just three, it may be useful for NAMs to work this through in terms of the financial impact on their Tesco relationship.

Essentially, it is probable that the total Tesco take from your brand will remain the same i.e. they are unlikely to surrender any income currently coming from Back Margin; a proportion of this will simply move into Front Margin.

In other words, say the current 20% of trade price represented by trade investment will translate into 15% of ex VAT shelf price, assuming a 25% retail margin.

Only issues are 
-   What will happen to shelf price if Tesco want to drive sales really hard via a 15% price cut?
-   Will scale discounts be large enough to satisfy Tesco (i.e. their January price-cut test appeared to be profit-neutral)?    

However, on balance, Tesco’s move on Back to Front Margin represents a quantum leap for suppliers in that their front margin will be a direct result of sales made and will be paid in arrears

BTW, it might be wise to hold a bit back in case a change of management at some stage concludes that your category’s in-store presence needs a little ‘livening-up’ via an additional injection of trade investment…  

Passing the Tesco Cull-test: Hints from the Dave Lewis Grocer interview

See the full in-depth interview here, a treasure-trove of insight

The cull-test: Opportunities for all suppliers to get it right, irrespective of size…

Criteria for de-listing:
- SKUs with a small amount of customer appeal i.e. not meeting a real need
- SKUs needing too much Tesco effort i.e. vs consumer benefit derived

What Tesco want:
- Unique Propositions i.e. a demonstrable difference, a major hurdle for realists
- Innovations that customers value i.e. a real step forward that makes a demonstrable difference
- A good economic equation i.e. an appropriate mix of back & front margin

In other words, a mix of product, price, presentation and place that satisfies the felt-need of the savvy consumer…
…..and not forgetting the margin…

Tesco to move to 14 day payment for smaller suppliers – a ‘temporary’ competitive edge?

In a specially extended interview The Grocer’s Adam Leyland talks to Dave Lewis about future moves. The real value of this type of uncut, indepth interview is that it can be a source of missing pieces of their particular Tesco jigsaw, for individual suppliers. In other words, well worth a read by any NAM trying to anticipate what to expect from their largest customer…

The 14-day move
One particular gem is Lewis’ promise to pay smaller suppliers (less than £100k sales) in 14 days, and to make payment days category-specific, presumably reflecting delivery-resale cycles, and related to size of supplier.

Apart from the obvious relief, such NAMs need to calculate the financial benefit (and cost to Tesco) of moving from Tesco’s average 37 days to 14 day payment.

Assumptions:
Annual sales to Tesco                            = £95m
Current payment period                          = 35 days
i.e. Tesco pays 365/37 times/annum       = 9.86 times/annum
:. Amount that Tesco owe, at any time    = £9.635m
Cost of money say 10%
i.e. financing free credit                          = £0.964m

New payment period                               = 14 days
i.e. Tesco pays 365/14 times/annum       = 26.07 times/annum
:. Amount that Tesco owe, at any time    = £3.64m
Cost of money say 10%
i.e. financing free credit                          = £0.364m
:. Saving for supplier                              = £600k
i.e. Percentage of sales 0.6/95.0   x 100  = 0.6%
In other words, a gain of £600k to the bottom line

Impact on other retailers?
However, the real issue is how other retailers will react to this master-stroke in PR by a Tesco going to the heart of the public’s growing concern that ‘abuse’ of small suppliers can lead to less choice on shelf…

In other words, Tesco stand to gain a distinct competitive edge by leading the market in fair-share payment, resulting in loss of share by those who fail to follow suit…          

The Heinz-Kraft 'tip of iceberg' warning for vulnerable companies

The key driver is changing eating habits and consumption behaviour in many countries, resulting in reduced sales and over-capacity, a trigger for more of the same, in all flat-lining categories... These consumption-changes combined with structural changes in how we shop, and austerity driving consumers to 'make do' have brought Warren Buffet and his new lesser-known Heinz-Kraft partner Jorge Lemann to the M&A centre-stage to provide growth and/or add value to ailing companies...

How the targeting-process works (types of targets)

• Identification of categories under threat from changing trends i.e. growing health awareness causing drops in consumption/switching
• Acquisition of competitor for increased revenue or market share
• Complementary coverage in terms of brands, categories, channels and geographies i.e. scale economies, negotiating muscle up and down supply-chain
• Potential synergies where Production, Finance, Marketing and Sales can be combined/replaced
• Short-cut into innovation and diversification

Finding target companies

• Search for categories where shares are 'cheap' i.e. low and falling ROCEs, that 'can be bettered'.....
• Falling sales when other categories are flat-lining
• Identification of companies that have lower net margins resulting from inefficiencies and/or cumbersome structures (from an outsiders point-of-view)

Objectives
The acquirer needs to correct 'faults' that defined the target, fast, to minimise dilution of the combined organisations and convince shareholders of the 'wisdom' of the move.

This means

• Increasing sales and cutting costs
• 'De-duplicating' Fixed Assets i.e. Land, Buildings, Plant and Equipment ('they don't need two of anything')
• Reduce stocks, debtors (credit to customers) and optimise cash
• Increase creditor-days i.e. take longer to pay
• 'De-duplicating' job-roles
• Anticipate demands of the regulators re competition legislation
• Selling off anything that 'does not fit'

In other words, drive ROCE upwards to match that of the acquiring company

Action for NAMs

• For NAMs in target and acquirer companies, check through the above (and see more here) to anticipate the inevitable moves...
• For NAMs in other companies in category, re-assess the new competitive landscape (See Buying Mix Analysis)
• For all other NAMs, find ways of driving ROCE (your personal contribution, your company's and the customers' ROCE) to ensure autonomy, and become too expensive to buy i.e. so that the above synergies are not worth the cost for potential acquirers

All else is detail

Tesco culling: anticipating the obvious?

As the Tesco management-cull continues in high profile, the 30% product-cull remains beneath the pre-September radar. In the meantime, NAMs have to speculate and focus on the ‘no-brainers’, or wait and see….

One obvious criterion, apart from cutting overlap and de-duplicating ranges/categories, has to be relative rate of sale. In other words, given that supermarketing (!) is an extreme version of the 80/20 rule, and a key issue for Tesco has to be what to do about the long tail of slow-selling SKUs...

One approach would be to agree an economic tail-length and simply cut off the rest – the ‘P&G approach’?  
This would obviously result in issues re space redundancies, franchising the freed-up space, or even outlet disposal.

An alternative way forward would be to acknowledge that the long tail exists in many categories because demand exists, albeit in low purchasing frequencies. The problem of viability arises because of the relatively high cost of bricks & mortar space, and the need for physical productivity.

However, in online retailing, selling space is limitless and is available at minimal cost...
Does this mean that Tesco will simply shift ‘long tail’ SKUs into their online offering, leaving ‘best sellers’ in-store?

In other words, realigning the business  to focus on core strengths of B&M retailing (simpler offer), and making online more productive (the Unilever approach?)

I wonder which way ex-Unilever Dave Lewis will choose?