Tesco Supplier Contracts - a ‘back to front’ move in trade relationships?

On Thursday, Tesco is expected to announce that it is making major changes in supplier contracts by shifting its emphasis from back-margin to front-margin.

In practice, this has to mean that commercial income (trade investment) will be translated into sales-based reward, and presumably negotiated into trade margin and volume discounts. Given the sums involved, with trade investment running at 20% of their sales for many suppliers, and average trade margins at 25% of a retailer’s net sales, it is imperative that suppliers enter these re-negotiations, well prepared.

In effect, this means that a supplier has to be very clear about the actual cost to the business of each element of the supplier trade investment package, the purpose, the KPIs and the terms of compliance. Converting these sums into the incremental retail sales (ex VAT) that they represent, based on the retailer’s current net margin, will help in adding value in negotiation.

More importantly, it will remind the NAM that any transfer into front-margin has to be linked with appropriate levels of incremental sales.

In other words, as front-margin currently consists of a mix of the retailer’s trade margin and unconditional volume discounts (!) it is vital that any additional volume-based discounts should be made conditional upon specific initiatives hitting pre-agreed KPI targets, and paid in arrears – a reward for additional effort by the retail-partner, the original purpose of trade investment.

If Tesco manages to make this fundamental change in their supplier relationships, and unless suppliers are able to tie the incentives to specific in-store initiatives, it is probable that much of the monies will transfer into price support.

This means that other multiples will have to follow suit, or risk loss of market share.

Time for a fundamental re-assessment of the TOTAL support package your brand needs in making itself available to the consumer?

Tesco heading to a 25% market share...?

If a 25% market share represents a point where a retailer begins to attract the negative attentions of consumers, suppliers, special interest groups, politicians and media, this may result in a defensive mode where more energy is spent excusing behaviour than growing the business.

Given the global potential for Tesco, a return to a 25% UK market share could represent a long term opportunity for the company and its NAMs…

Positive:

• Tesco would still dominate its home market, a key criterion for global players
• Media criticism would possibly divert to other retailers growing into the space
• Tesco could focus on doing what is right for markets home and abroad, better than the competition
• UK emphasis could be placed on optimising domestic profitability to fund global growth
• Stabilised UK supplier-partnerships could be leveraged for global risk management & joint profitability

Minus:

• A high-grade domestic team would be required in order to keep the UK share ‘on hold’ at 25%
• …meaning less glory for UK managers vs their overseas colleagues
• Any UK ‘distractions’ would threaten Tesco’s ability to optimise global opportunities, meaning ‘whiter than white’ performance would be a key requirement

Interesting:

• Patently over-spaced in large scale outlets, Tesco could use that space to focus on taking shopper-marketing and in-store theatre to their limits
• The resulting learnings would mean that their UK outlets could become test-beds for execution overseas
• UK NAMs with high quality and innovative ideas could optimise potential with what could become the best retailer in town
• …a stepping-stone to global opportunity?

In other words, Tesco and their NAMs might be better off aiming for a 25% share of every global market than trying to prop up an unsustainable 30% share in the UK...

Besides which, a 25% grocery share would still allow Tesco to optimise all of those non-grocery channels in the UK, below the radar…

Hedge Funds move on Major Multiples Store Portfolios

According to reports in The Sunday Times (p1 Business section, 26-01-2014) hedge funds have taken stakes in Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Morrisons with a radical plan to hive off their property empires.  In other words, American activist investors (Elliott, and apparently other activist funds have acquired small stakes in the three retailers) believe that, especially following disappointing Christmas results, the stock market undervalues the properties and that hiving off and flotation of the new property companies would release some of that value by appealing to a new type of ‘property-focused’ investor..

The plan is based upon a similar move last year by Loblaw.
(Morrisons are already exploring some property release, and Dalton Philips includes Loblaw on his CV...)

The ‘hidden’ value:
Retailer          Market capitalisation  Estate value   'Surplus'
Tesco                      £26bn                      £38bn             £12bn                                                                              
Sainsbury’s              £6.9bn                    £11.5bn          £4.6bn                                                                          
Morrisons                £5.7bn                     £9bn              £3.3bn

More details are available in The Sunday Times article.

Incidentally, for those in H&B, Elliott recently forced US drugs distributor McKesson to raise its bid for Celesio, in a deal now concluded.

Whilst the activist-investor route may well be resisted by the retailers, the idea of releasing value that could be part-returned to shareholders might appeal, thus propping up the share price…

However, in doing so, the retailers would lose some control, and also pick up an additional KPI based on maintaining the value of their retail properties, at a time when all three are focused on optimising like-for-like sales… However, if the hedge funds increase their stakes, then increasing shareholder value moves up the agenda, along with the aggravation...

For NAMs, all of this means that a renewed emphasis on financial performance, the value of trade investment and especially the ability to calculate and demonstrate the impact of all supplier-support on the retailer’s share price, becomes a critical requirement in the day-job…

Tesco Q3 - the update options for suppliers?

Given the positive market reaction to a review and probable sale of its Fresh and Easy operation, the resulting focus on core domestic market dominance and business development of overseas markets has to represent a short-term breathing space for Tesco.

The company now has an opportunity to intensify its £1bn regeneration project, perhaps switching the emphasis to food, as the world wakes up to the fact that austerity-driven consumers ‘making do’ have taken real demand from the replacement and new product market in non-foods….

Financial emphasis
Given the city’s focus on financial performance, then Tesco will need to demonstrate its new direction by squeezing costs and driving sales, whilst becoming potentially even more appreciative of the financial value of brands.

Suppliers in turn need to be able to calculate and demonstrate the impact on the Tesco P&L of margin, credit, settlement discount, ATL, trade funding, GMROII and even deductions…
An opportunity for financially articulate NAMs to sound like Tesco think?

A virtual US presence?
Meanwhile, a 100% withdrawal from the US probably means that despite an otherwise global success, Tesco will find it impossible to re-enter the US in the next 10 years. However, leaving aside a traditional 20th century bricks & mortar approach, Tesco could demonstrate its 21st century vision by building and maintaining a virtual presence in the US via:

• Private label via an agency network to build brand awareness
• Online: as a leading online player Tesco could use a combination of local partners in appropriate categories

Both are relatively low-cost, low-risk options especially for a company with an established presence and highly relevant experience elsewhere…

An opportunity for suppliers in relevant categories?

Tesco Want Closer Links With Suppliers – Ready?

The Tesco presentation has been well covered elsewhere, and  Philip Clarke’s full speech is available on the Tesco website.

However, in terms of ‘getting personal’, nothing beats the real thing. Best to have been a member of the audience and to have experienced the passion in person. Straight from the main man, a promise to work more closely with suppliers. These guys are really serious about more collaboration with the right trade partners in order to create a more personalised consumer offer, reflecting the current multi-channel environment and anticipating future demand.

In other words, Tesco feel the need to innovate and believe they can best do that in collaboration with suppliers. 

Keeping the best for Tesco, on condition...
However, I would suggest that they feel the need to such an extent that they will go to third parties should suppliers be found wanting…  This means saving your best ideas for Tesco, thereby potentially accessing 31+% of the UK market.

In return, it is vital to demand a fair-share relationship, based on a robust financial partnership, all wrapped up in a contractual agreement, of equal value to each side, in terms of both letter and spirit of the deal…

Getting there means being able to calculate the real cost to you, and being able to demonstrate the full financial value of your offering to Tesco, convincingly…

This time it is different
Tesco are serious, and they need serious trade partners.  In going for broke with Tesco, you are going to make your biggest UK customer bigger.
It is therefore vital that you also secure a fair share of the action…

Incidentally, participating in the live personal experience is truly incremental.
It probably explains why the IGD Convention is a sell-out every year – a key issue being the location of a venue large enough to accommodate all applicants…! 

What next for the Tesco NAM?

Given yesterday’s long-heralded results, it might have occurred to Tesco NAMs that their best option might be a discrete pitch for the JS account management role. Better, however, to try to place Tesco’s results in perspective before making irreversible moves.

Essentially, for the past ten years Tesco have been going-for-broke in trying to achieve global presence, at an obvious cost to their UK business. The City have never really looked beyond the UK scene in assessing their potential, seeing overseas initiatives as high risk and costly.

Basis of global retailing
In the process, Tesco lost sight of one of the basic principles of successful global retailing – maintain profitable dominance of the home market. Otherwise, domestic issues arising from a major share and the resulting pressure on special interest groups become over-distracting in terms of pursuing global presence.

Putting Tesco in today's context
We have to remember the following:

1. The world is currently undergoing one of the most fundamental changes and unprecedented upheavals ever experienced, affecting the fundamentals of capitalism, let alone buying and selling…everywhere
2. The embryo savvy consumer has morphed into a mature adult determined to settle for nothing less than demonstrable value for money, in most places
3. The younger generation have bypassed ‘naïve’ mode and are coming ready-equipped with the views and technology of mature-savvy, with no baggage (think how few are watching TV or partaking of ‘mainstream’ anything…)
4. January’s profit warning has forced Tesco to re-balance its business model, re-focusing on UK performance
5. So, it has cost £1bn, and hit the bottom line, big deal…(Have you been into your local newly-focused Tesco lately, where even a little has helped…)
6. They still have 30% share of the market, almost double the net margin of JS and the scale to make a difference to savvy shoppers...the ones who count...
7. Rest-of-world business has always represented issues for Tesco, and in the current global climate, they are coping better than most (seen Carrefour's results lately?)
8. The US is proving to be a slow burn, and draining global profits at £78m per annum, a small price to pay to establish their presence in one of the world’s most challenging markets. Tesco still represents ‘small & fresh’ in a market that tends to be ‘big & stale’, and needs to scale back, cut costs and achieve break-even, knowing that if they pull out now, no future CEO will ever stick her neck out and try again….
9. Tesco have managed (by luck or judgement, who cares?) to avoid the big Euro-countries that are participating in a slow train-crash, with unimaginable consequences...(forget MSM, read the blogs)
10. Meanwhile their CEE, and Asian businesses are ready to capitalise on any whisper of an upturn…and the UK abounds with opportunities for NAMs to help Tesco innovate, like never before...

In other words, no need to dust down the CV yet… 

Tesco catchup in the UK - a need for context?

Yesterday’s news of Tesco’s improved 3.4% sales growth is encouraging but needs to be kept in context:
- UK refocus: The company has completely refocused on the UK market, and has been spending appropriately (£1bn) since January
- Inflation: With food inflation running at 3.2%, Tesco is only slightly ahead
- Market growth: With the overall food market growing at 3.9%, Tesco is slightly behind
- Competition: Rivals are growing faster (Asda +6.2%, JS +4.6%)
- Fundamental ratios:
            -  where Tesco are:     ROCE12.3%, Net Margin5.9%, Stockturn 17.9 times, Gearing 55.8%
- Fundamental ratios:
            -  where Tesco need to be: ROCE 15%, Net Margin 5.0%, Stockturn 25 times, Gearing 30%
- Outside help: At 3.4% growth rate, a tightly-run Tesco will need considerable supplier support to improve these ratios, and hold UK market share
-      ..especially if they decide to take the nuclear pricing option 

Bearing in mind that ‘It ain't over till the fat lady sings…’, Tesco cannot afford to optimise overseas opportunities until this UK issue is resolved

In other words, Tesco needs to deliver on the fundamental key ratios and hold 31% market share, with growth matching that of the market, before being able to ‘park’ the UK….

As a supplier, it is now time to decide the extent to which you are prepared to offer a little help…

Tesco’s ‘arm’s length’ artisan coffee shop business, an approach to 'over-branding?'

                                                                           pic: University of Cambridge
Yesterday’s announcement of Tesco’s entry into the artisan coffee shop business via a non-controlling stake in Taylor Street represents a move to ‘….help build brands where we believe we can add value; much in the same way we did with [garden centre chain] Dobbies, [video and music-streaming sites] blinkbox, and We7’.
It could also an acknowledgement that the Tesco name is ‘over-branded’, at least in the UK.

An incremental option for Tesco? 
This means that Tesco could now begin to capitalise on its ‘back-of-shop’ and supply chain expertise/muscle, leaving all ‘front-of-shop’ activities to their business partners….. "we are investing in the entrepreneurial founders of a new venture. The Tolley family will decide the business strategy….Taylor Street is a successful artisan coffee shop business with a loyal and thriving customer base…"

Why the hands-off approach?
Tesco need play no overt role in the day-to-day business, i.e. front-of-house, but the likely addition of buying muscle, distribution, instore décor/equipment, purchasing of roll-out sites, and potential use of spare space in ‘over-capacity’ stores could provide all the help a small company needs, and can receive from a ‘sleeping’ partner that also has one eye open…
In practice, everything the consumer sees will be Taylor Street/ Harris and Hoole, whilst what the consumer cannot see, will be supplied by Tesco..
A neat way for Tesco to generate incremental profits, without adding to ‘Tesco’ presence in the UK.

The supplier’s options?
From a supplier point of view, the customer gets bigger…
However, this can represent an opportunity for those who really think through and are willing to integrate with Tesco’s options for a company with a 30% share of the grocery sector, and an engine that is capable of far more…

Tesco trials UK’s first virtual stores

                                                                                      pic: The Financial Times
Tesco on Monday launched a two-week trial of the UK’s first interactive virtual grocery store at London’s Gatwick airport, following positive results in Korea,  an innovation which generated 25 million online posts around the globe. See Tesco Vid

Holiday-makers in the North Terminal departure lounge can browse 80 core products, from milk and bread to toilet paper, displayed on 10 large refrigerator-sized touch screens. They can scan bar codes with a smartphone to place them in a Tesco.com online shopping basket, and arrange for delivery when they return from holiday.

On-site help
There are staff on hand to explain how it works, to talk shoppers through how to download the app and sign up to Tesco.com – if they aren’t already using it – and even a couple of iPads to let customers sign up there and then.

Roll-out options?
If the trial is successful, Tesco could position the interactive screens anywhere members of the public congregate, the only limitation being cost-effectiveness…

Korea reality vs. the UK?
However, a key difference between the two markets is that the online-distribution infrastructure in Korea is so well advanced that it is possible for commuters to place an online order en route and have the goods delivered on arrival home.

UK distribution limitations
In the UK it will be necessary for Tesco to so manage expectation that the new facility will be seen as an enhancement to normal online shopping, fitting in with the shopper’s routine ordering-delivery process.

Direct vs broadcast media?
In terms of funding, the bar-code units will probably replace traditional poster-advertising, whilst much of Tesco’s Press and TV media could possibly be converted to direct-response advertising by incorporating bar-codes wherever possible. It would also be possible to auction some premium product-space to appropriate brand-owners.

Threat to traditional media?
The future of Tesco’s remaining media usage, thus challenged by measurable response, has to be open to question, in these unprecedented times.
In response, major brand owners may explore the application of bar-codes to their own eposter advertising, directing consumers to trade-partner retailers, by negotiation…

Either way, we are on the brink of fully complementary shopping, adding another spoke to the wheel of omni-channel fulfillment…
A pointer for your omni-channel NAM? 

Tesco's credit rating – what it means for you?

Yesterday’s warning by Standard & Poor that ongoing pressure from intensifying competition, weak consumer spending and lower profits could trigger a downgrade to its risk profile and credit rating should not be seen as another nail in the Tesco coffin.

Tesco's previous ratings
In fact, regular readers will know that Tesco have been here before (Moody’s in April 2012, and May 2009). It also helps to bear in mind that the credit rating represents the credit rating agency's evaluation of qualitative and quantitative information for a company or government; including non-public information obtained by the credit rating agencies analysts. Yesterday’s announcement referred to a long term (i.e. after a year) rating, making it more expensive to borrow, but no issues in the short term.

Why the rating matters to you
However, the mention of  ‘lower profits’ as a cause, means that Tesco is effectively prevented from drawing heavily on current profitability to fund its £1bn revitalising initiative, or indeed any ‘nuclear pricing’ options (see KamBlog).

What Tesco needs to do
Apart from a need to make "targeted" disposals, cutting back capital expenditure and/or shareholder pay-outs as possible options, the ratings threat means that Tesco will be forced to place more emphasis on internal savings….
As you know, for a retailer these can include a combination of cost-price reductions, optimising of credit terms/settlement discount trade-offs, increased trade funding, strict application of deductions and improved service levels…

This means it is perhaps time to re-evaluate your position on each of these elements of your Tesco trading relationship, as a basis for determining your fair share of any help Tesco may require in funding its strategy.

Deriving your bespoke rating of the customer:
Finally, a ratings agency score can be a fairly blunt instrument from a NAM’s point of view. Better for you to derive a bespoke rating via a combination of analysis of the customer’s ROCE, Net Margin, Stockturn and Gearing, overlaid against your terms, trade-funding and service level, in order to establish and demonstrate your fair share of any remedial action…

Not doing so can represent more risk than you need, in the current climate.

Tesco's nuclear price option, if all else fails...

How to prepare for the inevitable?

No one, including Tesco, can say exactly what will happen, but it would be reckless of any stakeholder not to attempt to shorten the odds by eliminating  or factoring in some of the ‘obvious’ variables in the meantime…

The company patently has deeper pockets and greater scale-advantages than other players, but any positive momentum has to be sustainable in the long term, in order to avoid wasting gains made here and abroad over the past 20 years.

1. Share-price maintenance: As you know, Tesco’s share price has still not budged since its 20% drop following the January profit warning.  Any share price improvement will still be driven by ROCE performance, in turn driven by Net Profit on Sales, and Capital Turn, so these ratios cannot be allowed to be diluted, even in the short term i.e. this will require a combination of cost-price reductions, optimising of credit terms/settlement discount trade-offs, increased trade funding, strict application of deductions and improved service levels…

2. Deep-cut pricing: in order to sustain its current marketing approach aimed at retrieving lapsed shoppers, any price changes have to be credible and sustainable – cosmetic  cutting of a handful of KVIs will be insufficient. The ‘typical ‘shopping basket will obviously have to be cut sufficiently to attract the attention of a savvy shopper, not just the media. However, to maintain any shopper ‘regains’ the company will have to make across-the-board cuts permanent and sustainable, in order to avoid unnecessary de-stabilising of strategies currently in place.

3. Brand–Own label balance: this may be allowed to shift a little from its current 50/50 to perhaps 45/55 in acknowledgement of not only the credibility of the Tesco brand, but also the own-label pull of unprecedented market-change. It will not be allowed or encouraged  to move to levels of 65/35, if the company has learned anything from its last 30 years in the UK market…

4. UK/Rest-of-world balance: The UK as a feeder for o/seas development? NB. Like any globally-ambitious retailer, Tesco needs the security and cashflow of home market dominance in order to drive rest-of-world growth.

5. Market share: Here Tesco has three options, recovery of lost share, stop the current loss of share, i.e. maintain market share at current level, or allow market share to drift down to 25%, thereby removing it from the ‘kicking–post’ role in terms of being a political scapegoat, and a target for grievances of special interest groups. Of these, we believe the more likely will be the ‘maintain current share’ option, then using internal efficiencies to drive profit improvement...

6. Food/non-food balance: who knows, but the fact remains that Tesco's approach to non-foods reflects many of the advantages of being able to apply fmcg food principles to categories that were hitherto regarded as requiring ‘special ‘ treatment  because of tradition routing to consumer.

7. Online/ traditional retailing: Any marketing instinct would cause Tesco to follow natural development of a market, online being no exception…


Supplier action:

In the meantime, suppliers need to be clear about their own limits in terms of willingness to fund what happens. Suppliers also need to take advantage of Tesco’s temporary ‘weakness’ by insisting on a fair-share, pro rata  stance in return for any help given.

Use of a Buying Mix analysis will help in assessing Tesco’s pulling power vs. alternatives available (JS, Asda, Morrisons, Waitrose, the Co-op and ‘all others’ ) based on the retailing 8P marketing mix, all seen from the point-of-view of lapsed customers. It is also important that Tesco and its suppliers do not forget the current customers, those most vulnerable to any neglect in terms of being susceptible to the appeal of the opposition….

Developing an ‘obvious‘ context using the above factors, but fine-tuned to their specific categories, suppliers (and retail competitors) should then devote the remaining weeks/months to monitoring and modifying  the above factors/variables to incorporate latest data, before retiring to the fall-out shelter…

Tesco's strategic options, suppliers' strategic response

What is this about?

Tesco’s core issue is its profit warning in January, ultimately a driver of ROCE, in turn affecting the share price. With 2/3 of its business in UK, any setback causes the company to challenge one of the basic ‘rules’ in global retailing – ‘dominate the home market’. However, any company having more than 25% of a national retail market attracts negative attention from media, politicians and ultimately shopper-voters. Within the home market, supply chain efficiency made some large space redundant unless freed-space is filled via product diversification. Meanwhile, having grown share at the expense of less efficient competitors, Tesco is now being challenged by retailers that are as good as, or better, for a share of a zero-sum, flat-line market in terms of range, quality and service, as it strives to return to the Tesco 'rule of 25'.

Finally, the early retirement of a strong unchallenged leader left at least four people who felt they should fill his shoes…

Where is it headed?

Essentially, Tesco has four complementary options:

• Sell more of its current products to current users (increase basket size)
• Sell new products to existing users (Clubcard data, trade up via diversification)
• Sell current products to new users (use Clubcard data to profile ideal Tesco users and attract more of this profile with current products)
• Sell new products to new users (high risk, given two unknowns)

They need to re-apply this formula in the UK, delivering greater perceived value to shoppers, vs. competition, and then roll this strategy out globally.
They need to re-assess their competitive appeal in the eyes of shoppers, vs. the competition in terms of range, quality and service, vs. price. The leadership issue needs sorting in order that the entire company pulls in one direction, rather than each function attempting to ‘rescue’ Tesco. This was the challenge faced and successfully dealt with by McLaurin many years ago….

How does it affect you?

Essentially depends upon category, geographical spread and degree-of-partnership, but in the short term the above strategy will put pressure on all aspects of the supplier-retailer relationship, especially price and supply-chain efficiency, as Tesco re-appraises its supplier-base vs. alternatives available

What to do about it?

• Re-assess your competitive appeal to Tesco as a company, and brand within key categories, and re-engineer to optimise, where necessary
• Re-evaluate your match with trade partnership criteria (Potential, Partnership, Profit and Performance)
• Invest (time, money, people) in what can demonstrably help Tesco implement its strategies, and meets your ROCE objectives 

Above all, insist on fair-play in all aspects of your Tesco trade partnership, a once-only opportunity…

Private Label - The Fifth Generation?

                                                                                                        pic: BBC
No longer content with even the Finest Fourth Generation, Senbikiya sells only perfect fruit - with a price tag to match!

As you know (!), giving fruit as a gift is a common custom in Japan. But this fruit is not your normal greengrocers' produce, complete with bumps, bruises and blemishes. The pick of the crop is grown with exquisite care and attention to detail - and commands an eye-watering price when it comes to market.

Instore refinement

Classical music plays softly over the speakers in the Senbikiya shop in central Tokyo. The uniformed members of staff are politely attentive, ushering the customers to chairs and crouching down beside them to take their orders.

The ceilings are high, the fittings elegant, the lighting tasteful and the displays are beautiful. But this is not some designer handbag emporium or high-end jewellery store.  Senbikiya is a greengrocers!

See 10 pic Slideshow

The ultimate assortment 

There are apples, the size of a child's head, with evenly red, blemish-free skin on sale for 2,100 yen, or $25. That's each, not for a bag. Senbikiya Queen Strawberries come in boxes of twelve perfectly matched fruits at 6,825 yen, $83. Even on a slow day they sell 50 boxes.

Then there are the melons, each perfect, of course, and topped with identical T-shaped green stalks. They're 34,650 yen, or $419, for three.

Given Japan’s gradual emergence from 20 years of austerity, could the launch of a Tesco Fifth Generation in Private label be a more credible sign of the UK’s faltering steps out of recession via new levels of quality…?

Need to out-Tesco Tesco?

Tesco latest results indicate that apart from some local share slippage, their profit performance (Op profit margin of 6.2% in the one of the worst recessions in recorded history) indicate that they continue to provide a template for retail everywhere.

Essentially, they are simply good shopkeepers, doing simple things very well, while others are maintaining like-for-likes at a cost to the bottom line.

The options for suppliers include investing for growth with Tesco, and encouraging initiatives by other retailers that apply 'Tesco' principles such as meeting consumer-shopper fact-based need, space & supplychain optimisation, strong trade partnerships and effective use of money. (see how) for Namnews subscribers.

Sure, this will make Tesco an even greater, more powerful part of of your customer portfolio, and tougher to deal with, but the resulting skills are transferable, if you agree that the 'Tesco-template' is right for you. It also makes it easier to recognise the same qualities in other customers.
Find out how on our new webinars (H&B) & (Grocery+Nonfood )

Alternatively, why not short-change Tesco and invest the savings in 'weaker' customers, and see where that leaves you….

P.S.
Good video analysis of Tesco results on Financial Times

See Sky 3.5 min interview with Terry Leahy including suppliers, Value &
Discount ranges etc. on YouTube